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Many intelligent, capable, and successful individuals believe that their success is due to 
luck and fear that they will someday be exposed as imposters. A puzzling feature of this 
phenomenon, commonly referred to as imposter syndrome, is that these same individuals 
treat evidence in ways that maintain their false beliefs and debilitating fears: they ignore 
and misattribute evidence of their own abilities, while readily accepting evidence in favour 
of their inadequacy. I propose a novel account of imposter syndrome as an instance of 
self-deception, whereby biased evidence treatment is driven by the motivational benefit 
of negative self-appraisal. This account illuminates a number of interconnected 










1. What is Imposter Syndrome? 
 
Sarah is a philosophy student in a highly ranked PhD program, supervised by a well-
regarded professor. She received excellent grades throughout her undergraduate 
degree, which, along with glowing references from her teachers, earned her a spot in 
the prestigious program. Sarah’s supervisor regularly praises her work, and audience 
members respond positively to her talks. Despite this, Sarah considers herself to be 
less intelligent than the other graduate students. While they clearly have what it takes 
to be in the program and move on to permanent positions, Sarah believes her current 
success is largely due to luck.  
 
This situation causes significant mental anguish for Sarah, who fears her inadequacy 
will be exposed. Sarah works incredibly hard, obsessing over the minor details of her 
written prose and presentation style. Sarah will not be convinced of her own merit. In 
receiving written feedback from her supervisor, she hurriedly skims the positive 
comments, seeking out the few that indicate shortfalls. While reflecting on the 
feedback she has received on her presentations, Sarah remembers few of the (mostly) 
positive comments but can vividly recall the tone of a derisive audience member who 
rebutted her during question time, many months ago. 
 
The above vignette may strike readers as familiar. Perhaps you recognise this behaviour 
in someone you know; perhaps you even recognise it in yourself. This constellation of 
behaviours and attitudes is referred to colloquially as imposter syndrome, a widely 
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observed phenomenon affecting individuals from all walks of life—most notably, college 
students and career academics [Langford and Clance 1993]. 
There is much we do not know about imposter syndrome. Although the concept was 
introduced in the 70s [Clance and Imes, 1978], it has struggled to attract scientific 
attention [Bravata et al. 2019], and, up until recently, has escaped the interest of 
philosophers [Hawley 2019a, 2019b; Paul 2019; Slank 2019]. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of intriguing and important philosophical issues related to the phenomenon.  
First and foremost, the condition is epistemically puzzling: why does Sarah engage in 
faulty reasoning concerning her own abilities, especially when it causes her such mental 
anguish? Imposter syndrome appears to undermine the assumption that humans are, by 
and large, epistemically and pragmatically rational—that we reason in ways which track 
truth and promote well-being [Bortolotti 2014]. We are thus faced with the task of 
explaining why people with imposter syndrome deviate so significantly from these norms 
of rationality.  
There are also definitional issues to resolve. Philosophers have made an excellent start 
on outlining potential necessary and sufficient conditions for imposter syndrome [Hawley 
2019b; Paul 2019] and drawing parallels between imposter syndrome and other apparent 
instances of irrationality [Hawley 2019a], yet there is still much to be done. For example, 
an outstanding question is how to categorise the phenomenon: among the myriad of 
known mental states, traits, and maladies, where does it fit? 
Finally, there is the issue of value. Among scientists and philosophers, the condition is 
seen as overwhelmingly negative. Yet none have questioned whether imposter syndrome 
might provide some value to those who exhibit it.  
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In this paper, I will make progress on the task of explaining, defining, and evaluating 
imposter syndrome. I will provide a novel account of the phenomenon, whereby people 
with imposter syndrome are motivated to downplay their own ability due to the 
motivational benefits of doing so. Consequently, imposter syndrome qualifies as an 
instance of self-deception. A corollary of this position is that imposter syndrome cannot 
be understood without considering the value it holds for some individuals. 
To be clear, I do not intend to provide an account of imposter syndrome that is true 
for all those who exhibit it. One point of consensus from the scientific literature is that 
the category of imposter syndrome is heterogeneous: different individuals exhibit it for 
different reasons—psychological, developmental, and socio-cultural—and for any 
particular individual, their condition may need to be explained with reference to multiple 
factors [Clance and Imes 1978; Harvey and Katz 1985; Sakulku and Alexander 2011; 
Leonhardt et al. 2017]. I will simply argue that, within the concept of imposter syndrome, 
we must make room for a self-deceptive variant.  
 
2. Defining Imposter Syndrome  
 
Imposter syndrome is not a syndrome in the common sense of the term: it involves 
neither disease nor disorder [Clance 1985: 23]. Clance and Imes [1978] were careful in 
giving it the more neutral label ‘imposter phenomenon’, to avoid this association. To have 
imposter syndrome is simply to exhibit a set of related emotions, attitudes, and 
behaviours. Here, following the most common definition in the psychological literature, I 
assume imposter syndrome to involve three features: affective, doxastic, and behavioural 
[Harvey and Katz 1985]. 
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2.1. The Affective and Doxastic Features 
 
The affective feature involves a fear of being discovered and exposed as an 
imposter—one who does not belong in the role they occupy and does not deserve the 
success they achieve. As Leonhardt et al. [2017: 7] describe, ‘these individuals describe 
their greatest fear as being exposed as incompetent, less intelligent and thus as a phony’. 
This fear leads to a host of negative psychological consequences, such as anxiety, stress, 
and emotional exhaustion [ibid.]. 
 Fear of being discovered is related to the doxastic feature of the condition, 
standardly characterised as a belief in one’s own inadequacy [Clark et al. 2014]. 
Specifically, those who suffer from imposter syndrome believe that they lack ability. Such 
beliefs are not only false—they are just as, if not more able than their peers—but 
unjustified, as people with imposter syndrome are exposed to significant evidence in 
favour of their own ability (see below). 
A crucial point to note is that people with imposter syndrome do not hold 
negative beliefs regarding all their role-relevant attributes. Many believe that they are 
charming, personable and, importantly, that they are hard workers [Hawley 2019b: 205]. 
Thus, imposter syndrome is not a case of domain general negative self-evaluation—
inadequacy beliefs only relate to certain kinds of abilities (see section 5.2). Commonly—
especially in the academic context—inadequacy beliefs refer to lacking intelligence, but 
the relevant properties can vary between different contexts and cases. For example, in her 
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first-person account of imposter syndrome, Olberding [2018] describes believing that she 
‘lacked the standard cultural and class equipage of academe’.1  
Some discussions of these inadequacy beliefs assume that they refer to ‘innate’ or 
‘fixed’ abilities [Kumar and Jagacinski 2006; Paul 2019; Slank 2019]. While this is true 
much of the time, a better specification is that the abilities are difficult to come by. 
Cultural equipage is not innate or fixed, but it is difficult to come by without a particular 
kind of upbringing.  
 
2.2. The Behavioural Feature 
 
People with imposter syndrome are exposed to significant evidence in favour of their 
abilities; positive test scores, awards, accolades from colleagues and, of course, the simple 
fact that they are in the position they are in (while others are not) all speak to the fact that 
they are suitably able. The most puzzling feature of the condition is why this evidence 
fails to exert the epistemic effect one would expect. The answer to this puzzle lies in the 
behavioural feature of imposter syndrome. 
Imposter syndrome is defined by a range of biases in the treatment of evidence 
related to the individual’s abilities: 'Imposters … dismiss praise, derogate the accuracy of 
positive evaluations, and engage in other behaviors that insulate them against information 
that would validate their competence and worth’ [Leary et al. 2000: 727]. The most 
notable of these biases pertains to the interpretation of evidence; Sarah regularly 
misattributes her own success, as do others with imposter syndrome: 
 
1 Precisely what cultural and class equipage entails is difficult to pin down; it seems to point to a constellation of 
properties, such as the way one speaks (e.g. their accent and vocabulary), the clothes they wear, and the knowledge 
they hold (e.g. who composed an ‘Ode to Joy’) [ibid.]. 
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They attributed their successes to hard work, luck, knowing the right people, 
being in the right place at the right time, or to their interpersonal assets such as 
charm and the ability to relate well, rather than to ability or competence … These 
subjects were ingenious at negating objective external evidence that indicated they 
were indeed very bright. [Clance and OToole 1987: 52] 
 
Negative interpretation of success is accompanied by an inordinate focus on, and 
acceptance of, markers of failure. [ibid.]. 
On the standard account of imposter syndrome, explaining biased evidence treatment 
is crucial to explaining the condition. Fear of being exposed as an imposter stems from 
an unjustified belief in inadequacy, and this unjustified belief is adopted and maintained 
due to a biased treatment of the available evidence. To explain imposter syndrome, then, 




I will argue that some instances of imposter syndrome ought to be classified as self-
deception. What is self-deception? Consider a common example:  
 
Jessica’s teenage son has begun to act strangely. He comes home late at night with 
bloodshot eyes, smelling of marijuana. Despite evidence that her son may be 
smoking marijuana, Jessica will not accept it. She brushes off her husband’s 
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attempts to convince her of the truth. Upon finding various paraphernalia in his 
room, she concludes that it must have been left by a friend. 
 
A key feature of self-deception is present in this example: biased treatment of the 
available evidence. In brushing off her husband’s arguments and explaining away the 
paraphernalia, Jessica is contributing to the maintenance of her own false belief. 
According to the standard understanding of self-deception, Jessica’s own desire for her 
son to be drug-free causes her to engage in these biased practises.  
Consider another variant of self-deception:  
 
Chris loves his wife but believes she is having an affair. Although she has excellent 
work-related reasons for coming home late occasionally and no prior record of 
infidelity, Chris takes his wife working late as evidence of an affair. He carefully 
attends to her social plans, interpreting slightly anomalous events as planned 
rendezvous with her lover.  
 
Here the standard understanding falls apart; Chris does not desire that his wife is having 
an affair, in fact he desires the opposite. Philosophers refer to this kind of self-deception 
as twisted [Mele 2001], dreadful [Van Leeuwen 2007], and negative [Funkhouser 2019], 
and there is a broad consensus that a complete account of self-deception ought to 
accommodate both these forms [Funkhouser 2019; Mele 2001]. I will argue that Chris 
and Sarah are alike in that they both suffer from twisted self-deception.  
 
3.1. Defining Self-Deception 
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Here, I assume a definition of self-deception as involving three conditions [Mele 2001: 
120]. First, the self-deceived believe a proposition that is unwarranted by the available 
evidence.23 Second, this unwarranted belief is maintained through biased evidence 
treatment. This comes in many different forms [Funkhouser 2019: 116], the most 
common of which relate to: search—seeking out supporting (and avoiding contradictory) 
evidence; sampling:—selectively attending to and recalling from memory supporting 
evidence; and interpretation—positively interpreting supporting evidence, while 
rationalising away contradictory evidence.  
People with imposter syndrome satisfy both of these conditions: they believe in 
their own inadequacy (despite this belief being unwarranted by the available evidence) 
and they maintain this belief through biased evidence treatment, most notably, biased 
interpretation. Whether imposter syndrome qualifies as self-deception depends on it 
satisfying a third condition, related to the cause of these biases. Specifically, self-
deception requires that the relevant biases are motivated, i.e. driven by desires, emotions, 
or incentives of some form [Funkhouser 2019: 14]. 
One philosophically vexed aspect of self-deception involves characterising the 
precise form of motivational bias at play. Accounts of self-deception are divided into two 
broad camps over the issue: intentionalists and motivationalists. Modelling their accounts 
 
2 Note that ‘available evidence’ refers not to the evidence an individual possesses, but to the evidence that is ‘easily 
available’ to them [Lynch 2012: 441]. This ensures that those who possess belief warranting evidence in virtue of 
their biased evidence gathering (e.g. actively seeking out supporting evidence) may still qualify.  
3 I put aside the requirement that those who are self-deceived engage in behaviour that suggests that, at some level, 
they are aware that the relevant belief is false [Schwitzgebel 2002]. Philosophers generally accept that there are some 
cases of self-deception where the self-deceived show all the markers of belief in the proposition, with no indication 
that they believe the opposite [Mele 2001; Lynch 2012; Funkhouser 2019]. Thus, I will focus on this more 
straightforward notion of self-deception. 
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on interpersonal forms of deception, intentionalists claim that the self-deceived 
intentionally deceive themselves [Bermúdez 2000]. In contrast, motivationalists claim that 
while self-deception is motivationally driven, it is unintentional [Mele 2001]. I will address 
these differences in section 5.4. 
 
4. Belief-Based Utility and Evidence Treatment 
 
In this paper, I will draw heavily from an account of self-deception from the economics 
literature, a guiding assumption of which is that ‘people derive utility not only from 
possessions and experiences, but also from beliefs’ [Golman et al. 2017: 128]. In their 
work, Bénabou and Tirole [2016] emphasize two categories of this belief-based utility. 
The first category is affective: beliefs about ourselves and our prospects have a ‘direct and 
powerful affective impact’ [ibid.: 143]. Seeing ourselves and our prospects in a positive 
light is satisfying (utility), while seeing ourselves and our prospects in a negative light 
causes sadness and worry (disutility). The second category is motivational: ‘confidence in 
one’s ability and chances of success [or those of teammates] can be a powerful motivator 
to pursue difficult long-term goals and persevere through adversity’ [Bénabou 2015: 6]. 
For example, the belief that one is almost at the end of a difficult task motivates oneself 
to persevere. 
What are the effects of belief-based utility? Crucially, they are not direct: we do 
not simply revise our beliefs on consideration of the relevant utility. Instead, belief-based 
utility biases our evidence treatment practises—in the realms of evidence search, 
sampling, and interpretation—such that our (future) selves are guided towards beliefs 
with higher utility [Brocas and Carrillo 2000; Sharot and Sunstein 2020]. According to 
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this framework, the biased evidence treatment associated with self-deception stems from 
attempts to maximize belief-based utility. 
 Consider how this framework applies to the aforementioned examples of self-
deception. We can explain Jessica’s behaviour by assuming that she is biased away from 
the affective disutility (anxiety) associated with believing her beloved son is smoking 
marijuana [see Barnes 1997]. In the case of Chris, believing that his wife is unfaithful may 
be perceived as providing a certain motivational utility. As Mele (borrowing from Pears 
[1984]) puts it:  
 
the value of his jealousy-inspired belief in his wife's infidelity lies in its capacity in 
combination with his desire for her fidelity, to lead him to take steps to reduce the 
chance that she will have affairs by, for example, increasing his vigilance [2001: 
95].  
 
This excessive vigilance may be perceived as necessary to maintain or control the 
relationship, even though (paradoxically) it may drive the wife away [ibid.: 101].  
It is important to note that economic accounts of self-deception do not assume 
that the self-deceived are aware of these biases. Indeed, as Bénabou and Tirole write:  
 
… the process of manipulating one’s own attention, memory, or awareness must not 
be too transparent. There must be some opaqueness as to what exactly one is failing 




This framework is thus consistent with recent accounts of self-deception that argue for 
the empirical plausibility (and importance) of unconscious self-deceptive processes 
[Funkhouser and Barrett 2016]. 
 
5. Imposter Syndrome: Maladaptive or Motivational? 
 
Some psychologists suggest that imposter syndrome stems from problematic parenting 
styles or family dynamics. As Langford and Clance [1993: 497] write, ‘people who 
experience impostor feelings are likely to come from families in which support for the 
individual is lacking, communications and behaviors are controlled by rules, and 
considerable conflict is present’ (see also Clance and Imes [1978] and Thompson [2004]). 
Accordingly, ‘To truly understand the Impostor Phenomenon… it's essential to start at 
the beginning — with the Impostor's family’ [Clance 1985: 465]. On these accounts, 
imposter syndrome is neither intentional nor motivated, as those who exhibit it are 
simply acting out maladaptive reasoning styles that were internalised during childhood 
[ibid.: 55–62]. In contrast, I argue that imposter syndrome, in many cases, is driven by the 
benefits of believing in one’s own inadequacy. In order to understand this form of 
imposter syndrome, we must consider the utility of inadequacy beliefs, along with the 
factors (psychological and situational) that determine that utility.  
Consider the utility associated with believing that one lacks ability, as individuals 
with imposter syndrome do. There is obvious disutility involved, in terms of the negative 
affect that stems from such a belief. As Bénabou and Tirole [2016: 143] note, holding 
negative beliefs about ourselves (that we lack ability) and our prospects (that we are likely 
to fail) causes distress and anxiety. Thus, all things being equal, we should be biased away 
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from such beliefs. This is precisely what the psychological literature suggests, as there is a 
general tendency towards positive evaluation of own abilities [Taylor and Brown 1988]  
In the case of imposter syndrome, this negative utility is especially potent. People 
with imposter syndrome do not simply believe that they lack ability, they believe that they 
lack the ability that is crucial for succeeding in a greatly valued role. Not only do they 
suffer from this belief, they suffer from the resulting fear of their inadequacy being 
discovered and exposed. When considered in light of affective disutility, the biased 
evidence treatment associated with imposter syndrome appears maladaptive, undermining 
these individuals’ own basic desire for happiness. When faced with explaining 
behavioural patterns that work against someone’s own interests, psychologists commonly 
look to their history. Thus, it is unsurprising that many psychologists have assumed a 
relationship between imposter syndrome and childhood experiences.  
In contrast to these accounts, I argue that there is an overlooked benefit of the 
condition. Specifically, I argue that beliefs in low ability bestow a motivational benefit, 
one which is particularly attractive for those who wish to succeed in contexts where the 
pathway to success is both challenging and opaque. In what follows, I discuss a number 
of preconditions that (jointly) cause a belief in low ability to provide high motivational 
utility. First, the individual strongly desires to succeed—this ensures that any belief that 
aids in succeeding will provide high utility. Second, the individual believes that the 
domain is one where significant effort is required to succeed—this ensures that beliefs 
that motivate effort have high utility. Third, the domain is one where the individual 
believes that effort can substitute ability, such that a belief that one lacks ability will have 
motivating (rather than demotivating) effect. Finally, the domain is one where accurate 
belief provides low utility, rendering self-deception more advantageous.  
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As I will show, these conditions are commonly found in contexts where imposter 
syndrome thrives. Following the emphasis in the scientific literature, I will illustrate my 
point by focusing on the academic context. Nevertheless, I contend that such conditions 
will hold in other contexts where imposter syndrome is commonly found. 
 
5.1. Desire for Success where Effort is Necessary 
 
The first precondition is that people with self-deceptive imposter syndrome strongly 
desire to succeed. This claim is uncontroversial. Descriptions of imposter syndrome from 
the scientific literature regularly describe these individuals’ ‘strong desire … to be the very 
best among their peers’ [Schubert and Bowker 2019: 749]. The presence of such a desire 
is also consistent with evidence that imposter syndrome highly correlates with success 
driven traits such as fear of failure and perfectionism [Clance and OToole 1987; Kumar 
and Jagacinski 2006; Sakulku and Alexander 2011]. 
The second precondition is that people with self-deceptive imposter syndrome 
believe that, natural abilities notwithstanding, succeeding requires significant effort. This 
ensures that beliefs that motivate effort will provide high utility. Significant effort is 
necessary in contexts where competition is high and succeeding is difficult, such as those 
where imposter syndrome is commonly found. Consider the context of academia. 
Succeeding in this domain is exceedingly difficult: research suggests that only 3.5% of 
PhD students secure a permanent position at a university and, of those, only 12% 
become professors [Taylor et al 2010: 14]. This ensures that even those who are bright 
and talented do not succeed. In challenging domains such as these, substantial effort is 
required, which people with self-deceptive imposter syndrome are aware of. 
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5.2. Effort and Ability are Substitutes  
 
The third precondition is the belief that effort can substitute ability. Bénabou and Tirole 
[2002: 873] point out that, in most contexts, ability and effort are complementary: they 
combine multiplicatively to determine outcomes. Due to this, belief in our own ability has 
a positive motivational effect. In scenarios where ability and effort are complementary, if 
one believed that they had little or no ability, then even a significant amount of effort 
would provide them with little return. If I believe that I am entirely hopeless at chess 
then—fearing a short, embarrassing, and unfulfilling game—I may not bother playing at 
all. Believing that I am somewhat capable will prompt me to play, under the assumption 
that, with a bit of effort, I may win (or at least give my competitor a run for their money). 
Thus, in many cases, positive belief in one’s own abilities is motivational. Because 
positive beliefs in ability provide this utility, we are biased towards such beliefs. 
 Nevertheless, in some contexts, negative self-appraisal has a positive motivational 
effect:  
 
A student preparing for exams may … discount his previous good grades as 
attributable to luck or lack of difficulty. A young researcher may understate the 
value of his prior achievements, compared with what will be required to obtain 
tenure. A dieting person who lost a moderate amount of weight may decide that 
he ‘looks fatter than ever,’ no matter what others or the scale may say. [Bénabou 
and Tirole 2002: 904] 
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In such scenarios, we exaggerate the difficulty of the task at hand in order to steer our 
(future) selves away from ‘coasting’ or ‘slacking off’. This phenomenon appears in a 
number of different contexts. For example, Norem and Cantor provide evidence that 
when facing tasks with a high possibility of failure, many students dwell on how 
unprepared they are ‘in order to get [themselves] to work harder’ [1986: 1213]. Similarly, 
evidence suggests that people with eating disorders visually attend to the parts of their 
bodies that appear ‘fatter’, in order to motivate their own dietary restraint [Gadsby 2020: 
616]. 
In certain contexts, negative self-appraisal provides motivational utility by 
signalling to ourselves the need for effort. When negative self-appraisal is related to 
ability, motivational benefit will only occur if the individual believes that ability and effort 
are potential substitutes [Bénabou and Tirole 2016: 145].4 When we believe that effort 
can substitute ability, negative appraisal of our own ability can be motivationally 
beneficial. There is good reason to think that people with imposter syndrome believe that 
this is possible. After all, they expend incredible energy towards achieving their goals, 
despite believing that they lack ability. In fact, such effort is assumed to result from these 
beliefs [Yaffe 2020: 1].5 This intense diligence and hard work also pays off, in terms of 
‘excellent performance and approval from authorities’, precisely the forms of 
compensation required to succeed [Clance and Imes 1978: 244]. 
 
4 For example, this condition often holds in domains where the rewards are of a pass-fail nature, such as ‘graduating 
from school, making a sale, being hired or fired (tenure, partnership), proposing marriage, etc.’ [Bénabou and Tirole 
2002: 905]. As anyone who has underachieved throughout high school will recognise, believing you are terrible at a 
subject but needing to pass it in order to graduate is a wonderful motivator to study. 
5 In fact, some psychologists suggest the motivational effect of inadequacy beliefs is two-fold: first, people with 
imposter syndrome work harder to overcome their lack of ability; second, they work harder so as not to have their 
lack of ability discovered [Clance and Imes 1978: 244]. 
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Such effort cannot be explained solely through reference to a desire for success. 
Desire does not drive effort when one believes that they lack the necessary ability, and 
that ability cannot be substituted with effort. No matter how strongly I desire to be a 
fashion model, I know that I am simply not blessed with the right genetics—no amount 
of make-up, hair styling, or gruelling gym sessions are going to make up for that fact. I do 
not bother with these activities because I know they cannot make up for my genetic 
shortfalls. This explains why, despite believing that they lack ability, people with imposter 
syndrome do not simply give up; those who believe that they lack ability, but that they 
can make up for it with effort, persist in pursuing their goals. 
While those with imposter syndrome believe that they lack attributes that would make 
succeeding easier—intelligence, brilliance, talent, cultural equipage—they do not hold 
negative beliefs about all their abilities: they commonly believe themselves to be hard 
workers [Hawley 2019b: 205]. Believing that they did not possess the capacity to work 
hard would undermine the motivational benefit of believing that the task at hand is 
difficult to achieve. This helps to define the inadequacy beliefs associated with self-
deceptive imposter syndrome: those who exhibit it believe that they lack the kinds of 
abilities that can be substituted for effort. 
 
5.3. Accurate Knowledge of Ability Provides Low Utility 
 
The final precondition for self-deceptive imposter syndrome is that accurate knowledge 
of one’s own abilities provides low utility. In most contexts, accurate knowledge of our 
own abilities is useful for achieving our goals because it aids in planning. If my goal is to 
make it into the local basketball team, then an accurate assessment of my basketball skills 
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will help. For example, if I know that my offensive game is unparalleled, but that I cannot 
shoot free throws, then I know what I need to work on. I can focus my efforts on 
improving my free throw ability, up to a level at which the local team will allow me to 
join. I will not waste resources (time and effort) practising offensive skills, because I 
know this strategy will not pay off. 
However, in some domains, accurate knowledge of our own abilities is not so 
useful. This is the case when the pathway to success is particularly opaque. Consider 
again the academic context. What it takes to succeed in this domain is overwhelmingly 
difficult to discern, as is evident in the following anecdote from a junior academic: 
 
I visited the university’s HR advisor and asked her – naively – what I would have 
to do to eventually be appointed professor. Her answer was frank: ‘I have no 
idea.’ My group leader, a professor, couldn’t help either and told me that ‘there is 
no clearly defined path that will get you there’. The university agreed to investigate 
the issue, and later introduced a set of criteria to define what was expected of 
academics at different levels. But those criteria were set so high that it was 
impossible for anybody to achieve them – including the professors themselves. 
[Anonymous Academic 2018] 
 
One might respond that, while there may not be a precisely laid out pathway to success in 
academia, most academics still possess a (rough) idea of what is required: publication in 
top journals, citations, respect from colleagues, and the like. The important point, 
however, is that it is unclear which specific activities one should dedicate their time to in 
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order to reap such benefits—if it were otherwise, our hard drives and notebooks would 
not be so full of half-finished projects and abandoned ideas. 
 While in most scenarios, accurate knowledge of one’s own abilities is useful for 
planning, this is only the case when the necessary actions are known (if I know what I 
need to do, I know whether it is the kind of thing I am capable of). In situations where 
the pathway to success is opaque, accurate knowledge of one’s own abilities does not 
confer this advantage; even perfect self-knowledge cannot overcome not knowing what 
needs to be done. This point is crucial. As economic models of self-deception stress, 
when there is no utility provided by being accurate, alternative forms of utility play a 




Self-deceptive imposter syndrome involves a strong desire to succeed in a domain that 
requires great effort and where the pathway to success is opaque. This ensures that 
people are willing to exert significant effort to succeed and, given the difficulty of 
succeeding, this is precisely what is required. It also ensures that accurate self-knowledge 
is less useful for achieving this goal, as it does not aid in planning. In these domains, 
those who believe that ability can be substituted with effort derive a motivational benefit 
from believing that they lack ability. For such individuals, this additional motivation is 
regarded as significantly beneficial, as it brings them closer to the success they so strongly 
 
6 Of course, this does not entail that knowledge of one’s own abilities provides no utility whatsoever, it may provide 
many sources of utility (for example, when it is positive, it will entail positive affect). The important point, however, 
is that in contexts where imposter syndrome is found, accurate knowledge of one’s own abilities does not make 
succeeding easier. 
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desire. For individuals who satisfy these conditions, the motivational utility of a belief in 
lacking ability will outweigh its affective disutility. According to economic models of self-
deception, such individuals will seek out, attend to, remember, and interpret evidence in 
ways that reinforce this belief [Bénabou and Tirole 2016].  
 According to the proposed account, some who suffer from imposter syndrome do 
so for the same reason that Jessica believes that her son is not smoking marijuana and 
Chris believes that his wife is having an affair—because the utility provided by those 
beliefs outweighs their disutility. Consequently—and in contrast to the family dynamics 
account—imposter syndrome is explained with reference to belief-based utility and the 
biases it produces. Not only does this explain the biased way in which people with 
imposter syndrome interpret evidence, it predicts that they will exhibit other forms of 
bias. For example, people with self-deceptive imposter syndrome may exhibit bias in the 
realms of evidence search and sampling, whereby they will predominately seek out, attend 
to, and recall evidence that supports their inadequacy beliefs (as described in the example 
of Sarah).  
While this proposal provides one explanation for the behavioural element of 
imposter syndrome, it also illustrates how these practises qualify as motivated, as these 
individuals’ own desire to succeed biases them towards the belief that they are 
inadequate, due to its motivational utility. Thus, the account illustrates how those who 
exhibit imposter syndrome may qualify as self-deceived, according to motivationalist 
accounts. 
It is also consistent with stricter accounts of self-deception. For example, some 
philosophers hold that self-deception must not only be motivated but motivated by a 
desire to believe the relevant proposition [Nelkin 2002; Funkhouser 2005]. Crucially, 
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these accounts do not insist that the self-deceived are aware of, or control, this desire. As 
Nelkin [2002: 395] writes, ‘the desire to believe that p is true need not be conscious. It is 
likely not to be actively contemplated at the time during which the belief that p is formed, 
and it might even be difficult for an agent to recognize’. According to the proposed 
account of self-deceptive imposter syndrome, those who exhibit it unconsciously desire 
to believe in their own inadequacy, due to its motivational benefits.  
 Is this proposal consistent with intentionalism? Do those with self-deceptive 
imposter syndrome intend to deceive themselves into believing that they are inadequate? 
This depends on what one considers intention to entail. The biasing of our evidence 
treatment practises certainly appears purposive, as it guides our future selves towards 
beliefs with high utility [see Funkhouser 2019: 62]. If intentionalists are willing to concede 
that self-deception can occur as a relatively automatic and unconscious process (unlike 
most forms of intention), then the proposed model is consistent with intentionalism. 
Some intentionalists are willing to concede this possibility [Bermúdez, 2000], but at that 
point, one might argue that the line between motivationalism and intentionalism has 
become too blurry (see Funkhouser [2019: 67]).  
I will not take a stand on which account of self-deception is correct, or most 
befitting of the above proposal. There are surprising difficulties in teasing apart different 
accounts of self-deception, and many philosophers point to the same processes as either 
being intentional or (non-intentionally) motivated [ibid.]. To adequately adjudicate the 
different issues at play here is beyond the scope of this paper. 
I have argued for one particular form of self-deceptive imposter syndrome in this 
paper, but I leave open the possibility of alternative forms. While I have focused on the 
motivational utility derived from negative self-appraisal, there may be other, as of yet, 
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underappreciated utility to such beliefs [Sharot and Sunstein 2020]. There may even be 
forms of self-deceptive imposter syndrome that are consistent with family dynamic 
accounts. Childhood experiences may directly result in the adoption of maladaptive 
reasoning styles, but they may also operate via the mechanisms of motivated reasoning, 
through instilling a desire to believe in one’s own inadequacy. According to such an 
account, the relevant motivational biases would still need to be explained with reference 
to these experiences, rather than belief-based utility alone.7  
Before concluding, I will briefly address a challenge sometimes pitched against 
belief-based utility accounts of self-deception [Pinker 2011].8 The challenge, applied here, 
is to explain why people who desire success (in challenging and opaque domains) do not 
simply modify their behaviour, so as to exert as much effort as possible. Why would they 
self-deceive when this simpler route is available? In order to support my account, I need 
not answer this question. As discussed, research shows that some students focus on their 
lack of preparedness before exams and that some people with eating disorders focus on 
the ‘fat’ parts of their bodies. Crucially, both these groups claim that they engage in these 
practises in order to gain motivational benefits. So, people do engage in biased evidence 
treatment in order to motivate themselves. My argument is simply that self-deceptive 
imposter syndrome is another instance of this phenomenon; I need not also explain why 





7 This would constitute a form of self-deception that is importantly different from the more commonly discussed 
varieties, introduced in section 3. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility. 
8 Thanks to Eric Funkhouser for bringing this argument to my attention. 
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In this paper, I made progress on the task of explaining, defining, and evaluating 
imposter syndrome. I provided a novel explanation of a sub-class of imposter syndrome, 
as driven by the motivational utility provided by negative self-appraisal, within contexts 
where certain preconditions hold. This contrasts against psychological accounts that 
assume that the condition is maladaptive, resulting from problematic family dynamics. It 
also contrasts against contemporary philosophical accounts, which emphasize the role of 
epistemic obstacles, arising from social factors, as driving imposter syndrome [Hawley 
2019b; Paul 2019; Slank 2019]. Nevertheless, I do not claim to contradict these accounts. 
As I have emphasized, imposter syndrome is a heterogenous phenomenon: different 
individuals exhibit it for different reasons, and different factors may drive it for the same 
individual. The proposed account opens the door for future research into how these 
different accounts connect and conflict.  
How we identify the cause of imposter syndrome bears on how we define it. My 
argument shows that, within the category of imposter syndrome, we must make room for 
a self-deceptive variant. This identifies an unrecognised, yet remarkably widespread 
example of self-deception, one that many philosophers and psychologists have first-hand 
experience of. In turn, this opens the door for the use of first-hand experience as well as 
the literature on imposter syndrome to inform philosophical debates regarding self-
deception, helping to resolve some of the many disputes present in this literature.  
One question for future research pertains to the prevalence of self-deceptive 
imposter syndrome: what proportion of those who suffer from imposter syndrome are 
self-deceived compared to, say, those who are acting out maladaptive behavioural 
patterns learnt during childhood. While this is an open question, I would note out that 
factors related to parenting style and family dynamics have only been found to weakly 
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correlate with measures of imposter syndrome [Sakulku and Alexander 2011: 80–82]. In 
contrast, some preconditions I have stipulated as driving self-deceptive imposter 
syndrome (for example, perfectionism) highly correlate [ibid.: 86]. Given these findings, it 
may be the case that self-deceptive imposter syndrome is as common, if not more so, 
than forms of imposter syndrome that stem from problematic childhood experiences. 
Finally, the proposed account introduces an important consideration for how we 
attempt to treat imposter syndrome. If imposter syndrome is underpinned by 
motivational bias, then motivations ought to be a target for treatment. This could be 
approached psychologically—by working with sufferers of imposter syndrome to reflect 
on and re-assess the utility provided by inadequacy beliefs—or situationally—by working 
to change the conditions that determine that utility. 
However, we might also question whether imposter syndrome necessarily ought 
to be treated. In the psychological and philosophical literature, this point is undisputed; 
while researchers disagree on how imposter syndrome should be treated, they all assume 
that it should be. Yet, on the proposed account, there is significant value to the 
condition.9 Perhaps then, for those facing situations where the pathway to success is both 
challenging and opaque, but also considerably desirable, imposter syndrome is not 
something that should be treated. Perhaps such individuals should not seek to rid 
themselves of the relevant beliefs, but rather mitigate their affective disutility. Such a 
possibility is broached by Olberding [2018], who suggests that rather than trying to reject 
the imposter label, we simply embrace it, stripping it of the associated low self-esteem 
 
9 This is not to say that imposter syndrome is, overall, epistemically good, only that it has underappreciated benefits 
[see Bortolotti 2015].  
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and fear of being exposed.10 After all, being a hard worker who does not rely on natural 
ability to succeed is an identity one ought to embrace, rather than be ashamed of. 
Perhaps those with self-deceptive imposter syndrome should strive for the state that 
Olberding now finds herself in:  
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